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InTroducTIon
The approach of building mutually supportive trade, investment, and environmental regimes finds inspira-tion in the concept of sustainable development. Indeed, 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development recognized that 
trade and investment are necessary tools for achieving the goals 
of sustainable development.1 Economic activities may contribute 
to the progressive realization of human rights and environmen-
tal protection by fostering economic development, employment, 
income generation, and general welfare. This potential contribu-
tion is not automatic, however, as non-sustainable investments, or 
unwarranted interpretations of trade and investment disciplines, 
may defeat such general welfare goals by exposing the popula-
tion to health risks, causing environmental harm, or reducing the 
necessary policy space for sustainable development.
While its exact legal nature and status remain the object of 
controversy, at a minimum, sustainable development requires the 
integration of environmental issues in decision-making regard-
ing development and investment projects.2 If sustainable devel-
opment requires the integration of environmental considerations 
in the planning and implementation of economic activities, it 
follows that the resolution of economic disputes concerning 
health, safety, and environmental (“HSE”) measures should also 
be integrated into the various fields involved. This process of 
integration in dispute settlement places an emphasis on treaty 
interpretation and, particularly, an emphasis on the principle of 
systemic integration codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.3 In this regard, sustainable development calls 
for a process of normative dialogue, and the interpretive prin-
ciple of systemic integration guides the conversation.
The interpretation and application of substantive invest-
ment disciplines carries intense implications for the policy space 
available to governments to adopt measures conducive to sus-
tainable development. If compensation by the host government 
to the investor is required for the adoption of such measures, 
“even where regulatory action is taken in a fair and equitable 
manner, the potential cost to the governments may well discour-
age desirable or necessary environmental regulations.”4 This 
general issue is particularly relevant in disputes concerning the 
relative non-discrimination standards of most-favored nation 
(“MFN”) treatment and national treatment (“NT”) because nor-
mal regulatory activity hinges on the construct of categories and 
distinctions that underlie differentiated approaches and rules 
attaching to particular persons, products, substances, economic 
sectors, etc.
This paper analyzes key issues concerning the scrutiny of 
HSE measures under the non-discrimination standards. It first 
introduces the non-discrimination standards and then examines 
the thorny questions of discriminatory intent and like circum-
stances. The paper argues that the construct of relative non-dis-
crimination standards in investment treaties does not incorporate 
“necessity” requirements to justify HSE measures, in contrast 
to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Instead, 
the relative non-discrimination standards of MFN and NT allow 
for HSE considerations in their two core operative elements: “in 
like circumstances” and “less favorable treatment.”
The non-dIscrImInaTIon sTandards
The relative non-discrimination standards proscribe dis-
crimination on the basis of nationality. They require treatment 
no less favorable than that afforded to other national or foreign 
investors “in like circumstances.”5 The comparison of the treat-
ment afforded to similarly situated investors becomes the master 
key to the operation of the non-discrimination standards.
Given that the comparison process involves determining 
which investors are similarly situated, taking into account all rel-
evant circumstances, the operation of the standards is far from a 
mechanical application of a mathematical formula. Instead, the 
application of the non-discrimination standards calls for abstract 
legal reasoning and involves a measure of subjective assessment. 
Because of this, there is a degree of uncertainty involved in their 
operation, which may affect the policy space available to States.
Several questions are relevant to the interpretation of non-
discrimination standards through a sustainable development 
lens. For example: what is the meaning of “less favorable treat-
ment,” and is it established by disparate impact alone? Does the 
meaning of “in like circumstances” allow authorities to differen-
tiate among investors and/or investments on account of the dis-
similar HSE threats posed by different substances, production 
processes, geographical conditions, etc? If so, does like circum-
stances operate as an element of the non-discrimination stan-
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dards, or as an exception, which would transpose the necessity 
test of trade law into the investment regime?
This paper addresses the non-discrimination standards of 
MFN and NT together, since the focus of analysis is their rela-
tion to HSE measures. In trade law, by contrast, national treat-
ment rationales are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation 
of MFN disciplines,6 as MFN and “non-discrimination” are 
not necessarily synonymous.7 While differences between MFN 
and national treatment may be warranted in the trade regime, 
in the investment arena, both MFN and NT operate within the 
border with respect to largely similar issues. Both the Occiden-
tal case and the Cross Border Trucking case (examined below) 
have approached their analysis under the assumption that both 
the MFN and NT standards are synonymous, in the investment 
context.
dIscrImInaTory PurPose
Actual proof of discriminatory intent is generally not 
required as an element of discrimination.8 This does not mean 
that the purpose of an HSE measure is irrelevant, however. 
Account of purpose allows for proper consideration of the per-
spectives of both the investor and the State, including the public 
interest underlying HSE measures, and thus overcomes unidirec-
tional interpretations that consider investment obligations from 
the sole vantage point of the investor.9 Moreover, the purpose of 
the challenged measure is relevant since less favorable treatment 
is not established by disparate impact alone. In practice, national 
treatment claims arguing that any treatment that differentially 
affects a foreign investor, even if the difference is not attribut-
able to considerations of nationality, have not been successful.10 
If these claims were decided otherwise, the State would find 
itself unable to regulate in the public interest, with respect to 
processes or substances in a market dominated by foreign inves-
tors, without risking international liability, given that HSE mea-
sures would inevitably affect economic operators differently.
But how can tribunals determine the real purpose behind a 
measure? And, how should tribunals address situations of mixed 
intent, i.e., situations where a legitimate HSE objective co-exists 
with an impermissible motive? The difficulties involved in iden-
tifying regulatory purpose are compounded in the modern regu-
latory State, where legislatures and administrations respond to a 
number of often-competing interests, and where so much eco-
nomic and social activity is highly regulated. In light of the fact 
that States are hardly monolithic entities, the determination of 
protectionist purpose may become a formidable challenge to a 
discrimination claim or defense. The Methanex Tribunal, hear-
ing an arbitration involving groundwater contamination in Cali-
fornia, aptly expressed the problem:
In particular, decrees and regulations may be the prod-
uct of compromises and the balancing of competing 
interests by a variety of political actors. As a result, it 
may be difficult to identify a single or predominant pur-
pose underlying a particular measure. Where a single 
governmental actor is motivated by an improper pur-
pose, it does not necessarily follow that the motive can 
be attributed to the entire government. Much if not all 
will depend on the evidential materials adduced in the 
particular case.11
Several observations may be warranted in respect to the 
difficulties involved in identifying and proving intent. First, 
although in international law States may be said to express but 
one voice, democracies in practice respond to different, often 
competing, political interests. This political feature of democ-
racy is not to be condemned, especially when international law 
recognizes that democracy, human rights, and development are 
“interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”12 It may well be that 
different purposes co-exist and explain why a given measure was 
adopted.
In such cases, issues of mixed intent will introduce severe 
tensions between economic and HSE considerations. In this 
regard, once evidence reveals the existence of HSE risks, the 
parallel presence of illicit protectionist intent in some govern-
mental organ should not ipso facto render a measure illegal. 
If HSE risks are real, then the HSE protective purpose should 
in principle prevail over other purposes, given the paramount 
importance of safeguarding health, safety, and the environment.
Second, HSE measures cannot be presumed to be discrimi-
natory. On the contrary, where national authorities have applied 
due process and based their findings of risks and determination 
of the level of protection on the basis of available scientific evi-
dence, the specificity of HSE measures warrants qualified defer-
ence. It is for the claimant to prove discriminatory treatment, and 
not incumbent upon the government to demonstrate its public 
purpose. That said, the “smell test,” discussed below, the uncer-
tainties as to the location of the threshold involved in making a 
prima facie case, and the dangers of negative inferences should 
lead cautious governments to be forthcoming in adducing evi-
dence demonstrating the legitimacy of their HSE measures.
With regard to the evidence underlying a HSE measure, the 
country of origin of the scientific evidence is not necessarily a 
material reason for either accepting or rejecting it.13 The origin 
of the scientific evidence cannot sustain a presumption of dis-
criminatory intent because if it could, then most governments 
would risk attracting international responsibility for their efforts 
in assessing risks. Furthermore, the level of detail or specific-
ity required of the scientific evidence underlying HSE measures 
needs to take into account real world considerations and the sub-
stantial costs involved in producing a science-based analysis of 
the risks presented by the multiple substances, processes, and 
activities that interact in society. The burden on developing coun-
tries of producing tailored and specific scientific studies, in light 
of their limited budget for scientific research and more pressing 
priorities such as sanitation and food security, illustrates the ten-
sions surrounding the role of science in investment law.14
Third, in facing the challenges involved in determining pro-
tectionist intent, especially when considering facially neutral 
measures, tribunals are often tempted to adopt a “smell-test.”15 
The degree of circumstantial evidence pointing to protection-
ist intent may acquire a critical role, especially where direct 
evidence is unavailable. Thus, claimants will be drawn to 
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statements from different interests groups active in the political 
arena, figures on the expected benefits accruing to competitors 
in the marketplace, statements and memos from public officials, 
and any other piece of evidence that may serve to raise doubts 
as to the legitimacy of purpose. In S.D. Myers, which involved 
a ban on the export of hazardous PCB waste from Canada to 
the United States, the “smoking gun” tactic proved effective in 
convincing the tribunal that at stake was not a legitimate HSE 
measure, but rather a sham cover for protectionist purposes.16 In 
the Methanex case, the claimant even hired a private investigator 
to inspect the garbage of ethanol lobbying firms and to trespass 
into their offices.17
Fourth, resort to consistency and necessity could also pro-
vide indirect evidence of governmental intent. Such indirect 
evidence, however, only offers limited assistance because of the 
specific nature of HSE measures as well as the absence of actual 
obligations for consistency or necessity. Most often governments 
regulate in response to public perception of threats as they arise, 
and as scientific progress reveals what were until then “invisible” 
risks. Also, sustainable development calls for adaptive manage-
ment and evolving norms in order to incorporate new scientific 
insights and lessons learned regarding the operation and effec-
tiveness of legal tools. Thus, requiring overall consistency in 
levels of protection and attaching liability for failure to achieve 
consistency would have the law operate in fictitious conditions.
The parallel between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(“SPS”)18 of the WTO illustrates the different roles of harmo-
nization and consistency requirements in the trade and invest-
ment regimes. The protection of health in a society via sanitary 
measures that impede market access for goods that pose SPS 
risks will normally impose costs on other countries; to address 
this situation and secure market access to foreign goods, the SPS 
Agreement pursues harmonization of standards and even pre-
sumes conformity when international standards are utilized.19 
Investors and their investments, by contrast, are fully immersed 
in the diversity of national and local regulatory requirements, 
and it would have been quite far-reaching indeed if international 
investment agreements (“IIAs”) pursued harmonization of HSE 
standards across legal cultures and across differing levels of 
development.
With respect to necessity requirements, could less-trade 
restrictive alternatives provide indirect evidence of protection-
ist intent? In addressing this question, it must first be noted that 
the prerogative of countries to establish their levels of protection 
stems from their sovereignty, expressed in constitutional man-
dates to safeguard fundamental rights and to protect the popula-
tion, inter alia, from HSE risks and that these duties cannot be 
surrendered or abandoned.20 Second, countries are not obligated 
to justify their measures on the basis of necessity, absent explicit, 
conventional commitments to that effect. Third, any inquiry on 
less-trade restrictive alternatives should consider that reasonably 
available measures should achieve the same level of protection, 
involve the same regulatory costs, and restrict trade significantly 
less. Fourth, the textual differences between the SPS Agree-
ment, which explicitly refers to necessity,21 on the one hand, and 
non-discrimination disciplines in investment agreements, which 
do not usually include such requirement, on the other, must be 
given effect.
Fifth and perhaps decisively, in WTO law the remedy for a 
measure that offends the less-trade restrictive standard is ces-
sation, i.e., removal of the offending measure and adoption of 
the reasonably available less-trade restrictive measure.22 By con-
trast, investment treaties contemplate monetary damages as the 
remedy of choice, which highlights the need to avoid automatic 
transposition of trade law into the investment field. Thus, less-
trade restrictive criteria as indirect evidence is of limited value 
and could not by itself render sufficient light on illicit motive.
Therefore, arbitral tribunals inclined to employ less-trade 
restrictive criteria as indirect evidence should be careful not 
to transform them into a substantive necessity requirement. In 
claims involving trade and investment issues, the importation of 
a necessity test could involve investment arbitration adjudicat-
ing trade law claims, in excess of jurisdiction. Further, importing 
a necessity test into the non-discrimination standards in invest-
ment law would intrude much further into the regulatory auton-
omy of host States and potentially “lead to odd results.”23
Finally, with respect to “less favorable treatment,” the pur-
pose of a science-based HSE measure should prevail over NT 
or MFN claims, including de facto discrimination. A claimant 
alleging disguised protectionism in HSE measures will need 
to submit compelling evidence proving that the science is a 
sham, that no HSE risk exists, or that the government is operat-
ing solely for protectionist purposes. Admittedly, this is a high 
threshold. Still, the alternative could allow successful challenges 
to legitimate HSE measures, thereby compromising the abilities 
of governments to fulfill their environmental and human rights 
obligations.
LIke cIrcumsTances and non-dIscrImInaTIon
As the UN International Law Commission observed, even 
absent explicit reference to “like circumstances” or “like situa-
tions,” such comparative context is implicit in the essence of the 
MFN clause.24 The operation of “like circumstances” is not an 
easy task, however, given the elasticity of the terms and, thus, 
its ability to cast too wide or too narrow a net, depending on the 
level of abstraction or detail.
The application of non-discrimination standards raises dif-
ficulties where, as a result of local environmental conditions or 
the structure of a specific market, the operator that is treated or 
affected differently by the HSE measure is also a foreign inves-
tor. A hypothetical example presented by the United States Trade 
Representative in the context of the failed Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (“MAI”) clarifies the point:
One concern which was raised was the possibility that 
measures entirely consistent with MFN and national 
treatment may provide differing treatment to investors 
depending on the particular circumstance. For example, 
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a foreign investor whose investment is situated on a 
wetland may legitimately be treated differently than 
another foreign or domestic investor due to the loca-
tion of the investment, rather than the nationality of the 
investor. To address this issue, we included language in 
our proposal that would clarify the MAI’s definition of 
“in like circumstances,” in order to ensure that legiti-
mate environmental measures will not be challenged 
purely on the grounds of such differential treatment.25
The application of the non-discrimination standards to HSE 
measures raise at least two intertwined questions concerning the 
operation of the phrase “in like circumstances.” First, whether 
like circumstances operates as an exception to non-discrimina-
tion disciplines or alternatively as an operative element of the 
MFN and NT standards. Second, whether like circumstances 
refer only to operators in the same economic sector or whether 
it includes other differentiating criteria. In addition to these two 
questions, it remains open to question whether like circum-
stances could otherwise safeguard HSE measures that by design 
differentiate between investors on the basis of nationality.
like circumStanceS: an operative element or an 
exception?
Investment jurisprudence is divided as to whether “like 
circumstances” constitutes an operative element of the non-dis-
crimination standards or an exception that could justify differen-
tial treatment on policy grounds. Analysis of the Cross-Border 
Trucking case, concerning U.S. restrictions on cross-border 
trucking services as well as restrictions on Mexican investment 
in the U.S. trucking industry, is useful in approaching this issThe 
NT and MFN issues before the Cross-Border Trucking NAFTA 
Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel turned on the meaning and scope of 
the phrase “in like circumstances.”26 The Arbitral Panel sought 
guidance from other agreements that use similar language, such 
as the Canada-U.S. FTA. As the Panel noted, this agreement con-
tains an exception to NT in services trade,27 where “the differ-
ence in treatment is no greater than that necessary for prudential, 
fiduciary, health and safety, or consumer protection reasons,” and 
explicitly imposes the burden of satisfying the exception on the 
party according different treatment.28 The Panel then observed 
that the phrase “like circumstances” may properly include dif-
ferential treatment, under the conditions specified in the Canada-
U.S. FTA.29
Upon this reading of “like circumstances” and under the 
light of NAFTA’s trade liberalization objectives,30 the Panel 
reached the conclusion that the “in like circumstances” language 
constitutes an exception to the non-discrimination disciplines 
and should thus be interpreted narrowly.31 The Panel explained 
that “differential treatment should be no greater than necessary 
for legitimate regulatory reasons such as safety, and that such 
different treatment be equivalent to the treatment accorded to 
domestic service providers.”32
The Cross-Border Trucking Panel’s analysis highlights the 
difficulties involved in the operation of non-discrimination disci-
plines. In particular, the Panel’s reading of “like circumstances” 
as an exception to differential treatment could serve to avoid 
unreasonable results, considering that NAFTA’s investment 
chapter does not explicitly contain prudential exceptions for 
the protection of health, safety, and the environment that could 
justify departure from its substantive obligations, unlike trade in 
goods and services.33
Other NAFTA arbitral tribunals have confronted similar 
issues and adopted a similar rationale in the context of national 
treatment. The S.D. Myers Tribunal, for example, noted that the 
“assessment of like circumstances must also take into account 
circumstances that would justify governmental regulation that 
treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.”34
In a similar jurisprudential vein, the Parkering Tribunal 
considered environmental criteria in its application of the non-
discrimination standards.35 This case involved parking works 
and operations within the old city of Vilnius, Lithuania, which 
was protected by the UNESCO Convention concerning the Pro-
tection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.36 The inves-
tor claimed that other parking works and operations had been 
treated differently.37 The Parkering Tribunal applied a binary 
construct to the non-discrimination standard: it compared cer-
tain economic operators, on the one hand, and it examined the 
policy underlying the differential treatment, on the other.38 In 
this reading, the non-discrimination standard implicitly incorpo-
rates an exception for measures justified by legitimate govern-
mental policies.
It would appear at first sight that this formula could avoid 
excessive outcomes by taking into account HSE considerations 
to justify differential treatment. However, the practical effect of 
such reading reduces the policy space available to governments, 
as the meaning of “like circumstances” is narrowed down by the 
IIA’s economic objectives. Such a narrow reading of the object 
and purpose of IIAs risks frustrating mutually supportive trade 
and environment regimes, as the legitimacy of public policy 
goals is solely or predominantly evaluated through the lens of the 
investment liberalization goals. Moreover, by defining the pur-
pose of investment agreements as tools for protecting investors, 
all doubts and ambiguities are resolved in the investors’ favor. To 
overcome this apparent lack of balance, IIAs should be appreci-
ated as instruments for sustainable development—embracing its 
three pillars: economic, social, and environment—and properly 
placed in the broader international law universe.
The reading of “like circumstances” as an exception also 
suffers from deficiencies relating to scope and the burden of 
proof. In regards to the burden of proof, the interpretation that 
treats “like circumstances” as an exception requires the respon-
dent government to justify its regulations, relieving the applicant 
of establishing relevant, material facts and proving all the ele-
ments of its claim.39 Then in regards to scope, the “exceptional” 
formulation of “in like circumstances” hinges on “necessity” 
considerations, where arbitral tribunals run the risk of second-
guessing government regulators by testing potentially available 
least trade restrictive measures against investment liberalizing 
objectives. The deficiencies of such “exceptional” readings are 
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amplified by the complexity and dynamism of market structures, 
as well as by evolving scientific knowledge and changing social 
preferences in the modern regulatory State.
Instead, in the investment context, “like circumstances” 
should be read in light of its role as the key operative element 
of the non-discrimination standards, rather than as a defense, 
exception, or justification against MFN or NT obligations. In 
such role, “like circumstances” does not involve presumptions, 
narrow interpretations, or transfers in the burden of proof. Simi-
larly, such reading does not transpose the WTO necessity test 
into the operation of investment non-discrimination disciplines.
As an operative element of the standard, the “like cir-
cumstances” test requires the identification of all relevant cir-
cumstances that serve to distinguish among foreign investors, 
including HSE considerations. In that context, as clarified by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), analysis of conditions of competition in specific eco-
nomic sectors provide a point of departure, but neither exhaust 
the task of establishing the category of actors that should be com-
pared, nor the policy objectives that can be taken into account to 
define relevant parameters for comparison.40 It appears that the 
objective relevance of the circumstances for each specific case 
seems to be the correct standard of reference,41 including cir-
cumstances pertaining to HSE risks. Particular circumstances 
with respect to HSE issues should constitute a valid basis for dis-
tinguishing among otherwise similar investments or investors.42
Reading “like circumstances” as an operative element of 
the NT and MFN standards would do greater justice to the text 
and context of IIAs and would have positive systemic effects. 
This reading would not presume discrimination in the face of 
differential treatment or effects. Furthermore, this reading 
would also avoid a mechanical transposition of WTO law and 
jurisprudence into IIAs, both of which are different treaties with 
different parties, history, practice, text and context, structure, 
obligations, and remedies, thereby also avoiding the application 
of a goods analysis, or a services analysis, to investment 
matters. Finally, the scope of like circumstances would not be 
narrowed by the sole consideration of trade and investment 
objectives, thereby contributing to building mutually supportive 
environment and investment regimes.
The GAMI Tribunal confirmed the role of policy consider-
ations in the determination of “likeness,” and not as an “excep-
tion” to non-discrimination disciplines:
The Arbitral Tribunal has not been persuaded that 
GAM’s circumstances were demonstrably so “like” 
those of non-expropriated mill owners that it was 
wrong to treat GAM differently. The Government may 
have been clumsy in its analysis of the relevant criteria 
for the cutoff line between candidates and non-candi-
dates for expropriation. Its understanding of corporate 
finance may have been deficient. But ineffectiveness 
is not discrimination. The arbitrators are satisfied that 
a reason exists for the measure which was not itself 
discriminatory. That measure was plausibly connected 
with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar 
industry was in the hands of solvent enterprises) and 
was applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a 
disguised barrier to equal opportunity.43
Following the reasoning of the GAMI Award, differential 
treatment based on HSE considerations would not be on the 
basis of nationality, but on the basis of legitimate regulatory 
objectives. This rationale applies with particular force with 
respect to HSE measures of general application. But what about 
HSE measures that call for differential treatment on the basis of 
the nationality of the investor?
Governmental measures implementing multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements (“MEAs”) may well have implications 
for the NT and MFN standards in IIAs.44 For example, an MEA 
allowing performance requirements to transfer environmentally 
sound technology might place greater burdens on a foreign as 
compared to domestic investors, and environmental controls 
arising out of the Clean Development Mechanism established 
under the Kyoto Protocol may require countries to discriminate 
between different categories of investors on the basis of nation-
ality.45 In these situations, is the phrase “in like circumstances” 
broad enough to safeguard nationality-based discrimination 
based on an MEA?
Markedly, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal presented a “like cir-
cumstances” formulation that purports to go beyond discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality: “[a] formulation focusing on 
the like circumstances question, on the other hand, will require 
addressing any difference in treatment, demanding that it be 
justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to 
rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over 
foreign owned investments.”46 Further, the Pope & Talbot Tribu-
nal explicitly noted that differences in treatment will presump-
tively violate the non-discrimination standards, “unless they 
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) 
do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign 
owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly 
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.”47
According to this reading, “in like circumstances” can safe-
guard HSE measures expressing rational government policies 
but not if HSE measures, by design, distinguish between inves-
tors on the basis of nationality. Thus, under this construct, MEA-
based requirements would fail the non-discrimination test.
This solution may not contribute to mutual supportiveness 
between investment law and international environmental law 
because it could frustrate the objectives of MEAs. Three alter-
native options provide for a solution whereby the MEA-based, 
nationality requirement can co-exist with the non-discrimina-
tion standards. First, “in like circumstances” could consider 
the fact that the HSE measure is based on an MEA. Second, a 
conflict of norms analysis could apply to the conflict between 
the investment norm and the MEA norm, giving priority to the 
MEA obligation on account of the lex specialis principle. Third, 
general exceptions for HSE measures, where available, could 
safeguard nationality-based distinctions effected by HSE mea-
sures pursuant to MEAs. These three options would not frustrate 
the objectives of investment law because the nationality-based 
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distinctions would not be arbitrary or a disguise for an impermis-
sible motive. Further, their rational basis and legitimate policy 
goals are underscored by the fact that they have been established 
by the international community in an international treaty—the 
MEA—seeking solutions to global HSE risks.
in like circumStanceS & the relevant comparatorS
Then on the question of the determination of relevant com-
parators for the operation of the “like circumstances” test, the 
Occidental case, involving discrimination claims by an oil pro-
ducer against the application of Ecuadorean tax law, provides a 
platform for analysis.48 The key issue before the tribunal turned 
on the meaning of “in like situations.”49 Occidental argued that 
“in like situations” did not refer to companies in the same sec-
tor of activity, such as oil producers, but to companies that were 
engaged in exports, even if encompassing different sectors.50 
Occidental further argued that a number of companies involved 
in the export of flowers, mining, seafood products, lumber, 
bananas, and African palm oil were entitled to receive Value 
Added Tax (“VAT”) refunds and continuously enjoyed that ben-
efit.51 Ecuador responded that “in like circumstances” could not 
extend to sectors other than oil producers because the whole pur-
pose of the VAT refund policy was to ensure that the conditions 
of competition were not changed.52 Ecuador further noted that 
with respect to VAT refunds, all oil producers were treated alike, 
including the national State oil company, Petroecuador.53
The Occidental Tribunal found in favor of the claimant 
on the basis of thin reasoning and doubtful propositions, two 
of which will be noted here. First, the Tribunal noted that “the 
purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as com-
pared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing 
exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is under-
taken.”54 Such formulation is problematic, not least because it 
neglects the essence of non-discrimination principles in securing 
equal access to opportunity, particularly in respect to the condi-
tions of competition.55 Further, the public interest implications 
of such an unbalanced reading are readily apparent, including 
with respect to HSE measures, as governments will differentiate 
among different sectors for entirely legitimate reasons.56
A more balanced approach to non-discrimination has been 
elaborated by the OECD, a forum convening the most heavily 
regulated States in the world, in the context of the 1976 Dec-
laration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises.57 In its 1993 interpretation of the NT standard included in 
the 1976 Declaration, the OECD observed that:
As regards the expression “in like situations”, the 
comparison between foreign-controlled enterprises 
established in a Member country and domestic enter-
prises in that Member country is valid only if it is made 
between firms operating in the same sector. . . . More 
general considerations, such as the policy objectives 
of Member countries, could be taken into account to 
define the circumstances in which comparison between 
foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permis-
sible inasmuch as those objectives are not contrary to 
the principle of National Treatment.58
A second doubtful proposition underlying the Occidental 
Tribunal’s extremely broad reading of “in like situations” relates 
to the linkages between disparate treatment and protectionism. 
The Occidental Tribunal noted that it was “convinced” that 
Occidental’s less favorable treatment, i.e., the fact that unlike 
flower exporters it was denied VAT refunds, was not the result 
of discriminatory intent.59 Without more, this statement equates 
disparate impact with discrimination, and this interpretation dra-
matically compromises a government’s ability to regulate in the 
public interest, including by way of differential and incremen-
tal policy approaches.60 In this regard, it may be useful to recall 
the attempt by the Chair of the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment Negotiating Group to put together a package of 
proposals to address member States’ concerns on the impact on 
regulatory autonomy of the NT and MFN standards:61
The fact that a measure applied by a government has a 
different effect on an investment or investor of another 
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsis-
tent with national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment. The objective of “in like circumstances” is to 
permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances, 
including those relating to a foreign investor and its 
investments, in deciding to which domestic or third 
country investors and investments they should appro-
priately be compared.62
This approach is more nuanced and recognizes both the 
close link between discrimination and equal opportunity. It also 
recognizes the fact that a government may treat economic opera-
tors differently for entirely legitimate policy reasons.
concLusIon
The operation of the relative non-discrimination standards 
can penetrate deeply into the regulatory sphere of the State, since 
they require the State to adduce a coherent explanation of the 
relevant categories and distinctions underlying the content and 
scope of application of an internal measure. Policy rationales 
for disparate treatment can involve a number of public interest 
regulations, including with respect to the environment, health, 
and safety. In this regard, interpreting “in like circumstances” 
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards in 
IIAs that accounts for all relevant circumstances relating to the 
investment, rather than as a narrow exception that transfers to 
the State the burden of justifying its policy preferences, contrib-
utes to preserving the policy space necessary for the exercise 
of governmental authority in respect of health, safety, and the 
environment. Thus, the interpretation of “in like circumstances” 
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards 
ultimately contributes to building channels of dialogue between 
legal regimes relevant to sustainable development.
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